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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAY NAISBITT, Guardian ad litem 
for DARRYL R. NAISBITT,aminor, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOSEPH EGGETT, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
Case No. 8385 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Defendant had an automobile whieh was out of 
repair and the motor was not in good working order. 
The ear would not operate when moving forward and 
the Defendant proceeded to operate the car in a back-
ward motion backing up a hill since the engine would 
die when an atte~mpt was made to move forward. The 
engine would run only while backing T 161-2-27. The 
Defendant observed a sign on the road where Plaintiff 
was hurt whic;h indicated "Stop, Coas'ting Lane" T 168-
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8 & 167-23. The Defendant had seen sleigh riders on 
the hill the day before the collision and knew there had 
been a sleigh riding accident on said road the night be-
fore T. 167-19-25. 
The Defendant sraw a car going up this hill, but 
paid no attention to whether or not the vehicle contained 
a sleigh or sleigh riders T 166. The car actually con-
tained the Plaintiff who, with other boys, went up to the 
top of the hill in the car. The Plaintiff, a child 11 years 
of age, lay prone on the other boys all on the sleigh, 
Plaintiff being the third one on the sled and a guest of 
the boy on the bottom. The boys came down the hill in 
about a minute after arriving at the top of the hill. The 
boy on the bottom of the sled was the operator and driver. 
Plaintiff had nothing to do with steering the sled. As 
the sleigh proceeded down the hill the defendant ap-
proached a curve in the road T 162-28. The Defendant 
was backing up and was on the north or the wrong side 
of the road for vehicles proceeding in an easterly di-
rection or Defendant was on his left hand side of the 
road T 162-11, see also "Exhibits E and N". The sleigh 
was also at this time approaching the blind curve in the 
road. The Defendant knew of this curve in the road and 
that the cut and scrub oak obscured vision around the 
curve. See "Exhibit E". Defendant also knew that the 
lane was being used by children for sleigh riding and 
nevertheless continued to back his car up on the wrong 
side of the road and without sounding his horn as he 
approached the blind curve and without giving any 
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warnimg T. 169-19. The sleigh came around the curve 
on its right hand side of the road and the force of inertia 
and centrifugal force forced the sled to its right side 
or proper side and it ran into the back end of the De-
fendant's car. Defendant first saw the sled round the 
curve when it was 10 feet away at which time he applied 
the brakes and stopped directly in the path of the sled 
T 163-8. The resulting accident destroyed a part of 
Plaintiff's brain T 34-11, resulting in loss of memory, 
defective sight, and probable epilepsy. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
NEGLIGENCE IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY, AND 
UNLESS ALL REASONABLE MEN MUST DRAW THE SAME 
CONCLUSION FROM THE FACTS AS THEY ARE SHOWN, 
THE COURT COMMITS ERROR IN DIRECTING A VERDICT. 
POINT TWO 
A COURT EXERCISING APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
IN REVIEWING A JUDGMENT OF A LOWER COURT, 
WHEREIN A VERDICT WAS DIRECTED, VIEWS ALL EVI-
DENCE AND DRAWS ALL INFERENCES IN LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE VER-
DICT WAS DIRECTED. 
POINT THREE 
IF THE FACTS ARE SUCH THAT REASONABLE MEN 
CAN REACH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DEFENDANT 
WAS NEGLIGENT, OR THAT PLAINTIFF WAS OR WAS 
NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT THE CASE MUST 
GO TO THE JURY. 
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NEGLIGENCE IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY, AND 
UNLESS ALL REASONABLE MEN MUST DRAW THE SAME 
CONCLUSION FROM THE FACTS AS THEY ARE SHOWN, 
. THE COURT COMMITS ERROR IN DIRECTING A VERDICT. 
The laws of the State of Utah make it a misdemeanor 
to operate a motor vehicle upon the highway of the state 
when the vehicle is in an unsafe condition, 41-6-117, U. 
C.A., 1953. 
Moreover, 41-6-155, U.C.A., 19153, provides that no 
person may move a motor vehicle upon a highway unless 
the same is in good working order. The Defendant h~as 
admitted that his vehicle was not in good working order, 
and that it would not operate in a forward motion, and 
it would only run backward. Motor vehicles are equipped 
to steer only the front wheels and one cannot use the 
back wheels to steer the ear and it is most difficult to 
drive backward. The horn is equipped to throw the sound 
ahead of the car and not to the rear and the car is con-
structed to provide maximum visibility in the front with 
poor visibility to the rear. The jury were entitled to 
consider whether or not the Defendant was in violation 
of these statutes or otherwise negligent. 
Negligence is a question for the jury, and unless 
all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from 
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the facts as they are shown, a court commits an error 
when it directs a verdict. The following cases hold fast 
to this rule : 
Bates vs. Burns, 281 P. 2d 209, ______ u ....... . 
"(2) It has been frequently announced by 
this court that negligence is a question for the 
jury unless all reasonable men must draw the 
same conclusion from the facts as they are 
shown. * *"' 
'Where there is uncertainty as to the exist-
ence of either negligence or contributory negli-
gence, the question is not one of law, but of fact, 
and to be settled by a jury; and this whether, the 
uncertainty arises from a conflict in the testi-
mony, or because, the facts being undisputed, fair-
minded men will honestly draw different con-
clusions from them.' '' 
Scoffield vs. Sp:rouse-Reitz Co., 265 P. 2d 396, 
397; 1 u. 2d 218. 
"(1) Unless all reasonable minds must con-
clude that plaintiff was negligent in failing to ob-
serve the conditions before attempting to descend 
the stairs, the question of his due care must be 
submitted to the jury for determination. Baker 
vs. Decker, Utah, 212 P. 2d 679." 
Morby vs. Rogers, 252 P. 2d 231, ______ u ....... . 
"(1) (1) It is well settled that in order for 
a court to grant a request for a directed verdict 
or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
grounded on non-negligence of defendant, the rec-
ord must disclose no -evidence against the party 
so requesting upon which reasonable minds could 
find him guilty of the negligence charged. The 
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issue here, then, was whether the reeord disclosed 
any evidence upon which the jury could have found 
the appellant guilty of negligence. 
"(2) It is not a new or novel principle that 
acts of negligence may he proved by circum-
stances. Certainly, in many cases, particularly 
where the only eye witnesses are parties having 
an interest in the action, such circumstances are 
the only means by which certain facts may be dis-
covered. In sueh cases it is proper that such 
circumstances should be evaluated by the jury in 
whose province lies the power to believe or dis-
believe the testimony and evidence, to observe the 
demeanor of the witnesses, and to draw such 
reasonable conclusions from the whole record as 
may be warranted. 
"(3) We are of the opinion that reasonable 
minds eould find negligence on the part of the 
defendant from the evidence in the record. The 
trial court therefore did not err in letting the 
question of defendant's negligence go to the jury 
under the evidence.'' 
Stickel vs. Union Pacific R. Co., 251 P. 2d 
867, 870; ------D·------· 
"(5, 6) The authorities frequently state 
that the question of contributory negligence is 
usually for the jury. And that this is so wherever 
the evidence is such that reasonable minds may 
differ as to its existence has been stated innum-
berable times, which is undoubtedly correct. How-
ever, in view of the fact that before the issue may 
be taken from jury, the defendant has the burden 
of establishing plaintiff's negligence by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence it may be a bit more 
precise to state that the question of contributory 
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negligence is for the jury whenever the evidence 
is such that jurors, acting fairly and reasonably, 
may say that they are not convinced by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was 
guilty of negligence which proximately con-
tributed to cause his own injury.'' 
Martin vs. Stevens, 243 P. 2d 747, ______ u _______ . 
"(3) The question of contributory negli-
gence is usually for the jury and the court should 
be reluctant to take consideration of this question 
of fact from it. Nielson vs. Mauchley, Utah, 202 
P. 2d 547; Toomer's Estate vs. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., Utah, 239 P. 2d 163. The expres-
sions in those cases are in accord with this uni-
formly accepted doctrine. The right to trial by 
jury should be safeguarded. Before the issue of 
contributory negligence may be taken from the 
jury, the defendant's burden of proving both (a) 
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence, and (b) that such negligence proximately 
contributed to cause his own injury, must be met, 
and established with such certainty that reason-
able minds could not find to the contrary; con-
versely, if there is any reasonable basis, either 
because of lack of evidence, or from the evidence 
and the fair inferences arising therefrom, taken 
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, upon which 
reasonable minds may conclude that they are not 
convinced by a preponderance of the evidence 
either (a) that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence or (b) that such negligence proxi-
mately contributed to cause the injury, the plain-
tiff is entitled to have the question submitted to 
a jury." 
Nielson vs. Mauchley, 202 P. 2d 547, 115 U. 
68. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
'' (3) In holding that the court erred in find-
ing as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence, we do not wish to 
understand that the jury could not have so found. 
Whether or not plaintiff acted as a reasonably 
prudent man under the circumstances is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to determine. The mere 
fact that plaintiff had the right of way did not 
give him a right to proceed without regard to 
existing conditions. He must exercise due care 
and act as a reasonably prudent man would act 
under all the existing circumstances. See Bullock 
vs. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350; Hickok vs. 
Skinner, Utah, 190 P. 2d 514; Conklin vs. Walsh, 
Utah, 193 P. 2d 437; and McDougall vs. Morrison, 
55 Cal. App. 2d 92, 130 F. 2d 149, on page 
151. * * * 
''In our discussion we have only considered 
facts most favorable to plaintiff, and have not dis-
cussed the evidence of the defendant. A jury 
might find from all the circumstances that the 
facts and circumstances we have assumed did not 
exist and that the accident happened in accord-
ance with defendant's version. If a jury so found 
the facts, plaintiff could not recover. 
''Since the court erred in directing a verdict 
of "no cause for action" the case is reversed with 
instructions to grant a new trail. Costs to appel-
lant." 
POINT TWO 
A COURT EXERCISING APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
IN REVIEWING A JUDGMENT OF A LOWER COURT, 
WHEREIN A VERDICT WAS DIRECTED, VIEWS ALL EVI-
DENCE AND DRAWS ALL INFERENCES IN LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE VER-
DICT WAS DIRECTED. 
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Gle'fbn vs. Gibbons & Reed Co., 265 P. 2d 1013, 
1 u. 2d 308. 
"Defendant's contention that there was no 
actionable negligence on the part of the defendant 
presents a more difficult question, Inasmuch as 
the defendant was granted a directed verdict, we 
must view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff to determine whether or not there 
was sufficient evidence to go to the jury. Finlay-
son vs. Brady, Utah, 240 P. 2d 491." 
Smith vs. Bennett, 1 U. 2d 224, 265 P. 2d 401. 
''The evidence and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom will be viewed in a light most favorable 
to plaintiff. Cox vs. Thompson, Utah 254 P. 2d 
1047." 
Scoville vs. Kellogg Sales Co., 1 U. 2d 19, 261 
P. 2d 933. 
"We must view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to plaintiff, the victim of the directed 
verdict.'' 
Oibbs et al vs. Blue Cab, Inc., 249 P. 2d 213, 
...... U ....... . 
"We have held that where a verdict is di-
rected, the evidence on appeal will be canvassed 
in a light most favorable to him against whom it 
was directed.'' 
Galarowicz vs. VJ?;ard, 119 U. 611, 230 P. 2d 
576. 
"(1) A nonsuit having been granted in their 
favor, we take all the evidence against the Siegels 
as true, and give the plaintiff the benefit of every 
favorable inference and intendment which fairly 
arises from such evidence. Kitchen vs. Kitchen, 
83 Utah 370, 28 P. 2d 180; Groesbeck vs. Lakeside 
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Printing Company, 55 Utah 335, 186 P. 013; 
Maberto vs. Wolfe, 106 Cal. App.; 202, 289 P. 
218. '' 
Dunga;n vs. Brandenberg, 230 P. 2d 518. 
'' 'Ordinarily an appellate court in determin-
ingan appeal views the evidence, where it is con-
flicting, in the light most favorable to a sustaining 
of the lower court's judgment. (Citing cases). A 
reverse rule however applies where, as here the 
trial court directs the jury to return a verdict 
for the defendants. The conflicting evidence then 
must be viewed in a light most favorable to plain-
tiff.' '' 
The supreme court of Arizona in the above caption 
case held that where a truck driver was backing a truck 
that he owes the child to duty to protect him from being 
injured by the truck and that any evidence at all upon 
which reasonable men might disagree would require 
that the case go to a jury. 
POINT THREE 
IF THE FACTS ARE SUCH THAT REASONABLE MEN 
CAN REACH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DEFENDANT 
w·As NEGLIGENT, OR THAT PLAINTIFF WAS OR WAS 
NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT THE CASE MUST 
GO TO THE JURY. 
The Plaintiff was a guest and had no control over 
the operation of the sled, and there was no evidence of 
any contributory negligence chargable to a guest. 
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STANDARD OF CARE 
vVhenever an individual undertakes to do something 
which involves a greater risk to those whom he owes a 
duty, the law holds him to a higher degree of care. At 
168-8 of the record it is pointed out that Defendant had 
seen a sign at the bottom of the road which designated 
the road as a coasting lane. At T. 167-18 it was pointed 
out that Defendant had actually seen sleighriders on the 
road before, and that the night before he knew there 
had been an accident involving a sleighrider. These 
facts can be construed in no other way than that the 
defendant knew or ought to have known that the hill 
was going to be used by children for sleighriding. 
The conduct of small children is unpredictable. They 
fall within a class which is highly protected by the law. 
As a result, whenever an adult does anything which in-
volves a risk to children the law im·poses upon him an 
extremely high degree of care. 
The act of backing an automobile involves a greater 
risk than driving the automobile forward. The controls 
are constructed to facilitate and provide maneuverability 
only for forward travel. The only wheels capable of 
turning to alter the direction of the car are the front 
wheels. When a car is backing these wheels are not in 
a position to provide maximum maneuverability needed 
to avoid hitting children. The driver's vision is more 
obstructed when a car is being driven in reverse than 
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when moving forward. This all adds up to the fact 
that driving an automobile in reverse involves greater 
risk than when driving it forward. 
The above points to the fact that the defendant was 
acting in such a manner as to involve a great risk to those 
using the sleighriding hill. The following cases illustrate 
the fact that the law requires of a person in such circum-
stances a special standard of care : 
Callahwn vs. Disorda, 16 A. 2d 179, 181. 
"(8-10) Taking the evidence in the light 
most favorable for the plaintiff, as it must be 
taken, the jury would have been justified in find-
ing that the defendant knew or ought to have 
known that the child was in the immediate neigh-
borhood. She was charged with the common knowl-
edge that very young children are erratic and 
likely to move quickly and without regard for 
their own safety. If one knows that a child is 
in the highway he is bound to a proportionate de-
gree of watchfulness. Robinson vs. Cone, 22 Vt. 
213, 224; 54 Am. Dec. 67. She testified that be-
fore starting to back her car she looked into the 
mirror and out of the left-hand window but since 
the child must have been on the right of the rear 
of the car it seems clear that these precautions 
alone could not be relied upon with a due regard 
for the child's safety. In a recent Massachusetts 
case it was said: 'The backing of any vehicle en-
tails more or less limitation on the view by the 
driver of the area to be traversed and thus re-
quires corresponding vigilance on his part to 
avoid causing injury to persons who are known 
to be, or likely to be there, whether the vehicle 
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is being backed on a public street or on private 
land.' Eaton vs. S. S. Pierce Co., 288 Mass., 323, 
192 N.E. 831, 832." 
Springer vs. Sodestrom, 129 P. 2d 409, 502. 
"(7, 8) The conduct of small children is un-
predictable, and their propensity to run in any 
direction is a matter of common knowledge. 
Having once observed the child on the opposite 
curb while his vehicle was still motionless in the 
driveway, defendant's conduct in backing into 
the street without making any further effort to 
ascertain the conduct and whereabouts of the 
small child was not that of a reasonable careful 
and prudent person under the circumstances. 
* * :t" 
Jenkins vs. Bentley, 268 N.W. 819. 
'' * * * True, the driver did not see the boy 
before backing into him, yet the law imposes upon 
him a duty to ascertain that the way is clear be-
fore proceeding backward over it. Backing 
against plaintiff without making such assuring 
observation is a lack of ordinary care and is suf-
ficient to constitute actionable negligence. Kinsley 
vs. Simpson, 257 Mich. 7, 240 N.W. 98; Roach vs. 
Petrequin, 234 Mich. 551, 208 N.W. 695. '~**'And 
he must not only look backward when he com-
mences his operation but he must continue to look 
backward in order that he may not collide with 
or injure those lawfully using such street or high-
way. (Citing authorities) ' See, also, Embry vs. 
Reserve Natural Gas Co., 12 La. App. 97, 124 So. 
472. * * *" 
21 Blashfield Page 400 1469-Backing 
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''Where a motorist, proceeding along one 
street car track while a street car is moving in 
the same direction alongside of him on the other 
tract, sees two small children on the tract in front 
of him, the necessity of the children leaving the 
track being apparent, and, instead of stopping, 
turns aside to avoid the children and strikes them 
as they attempt to run from the track to the 
street the question of whether the driver exercised 
proper care towards the children is for the jury. 
Ferris vs. McArdle, 106 A. 460, 92 N.J.L. 580." 
"Where motorist sitting in his automobile in 
driveway observed through rear view mirror that 
small child was on the opposite curb, motorist's 
conduct in thereafter backing into the street with-
out makimg any further effort to ascertain the 
conduct and whereabouts of the child was negli-
gent S.pringer vs. Sodestrom, 129 P. 2d 499, 54 
Cal. App. 2d 704. '' 
McCarthy et al. vs. City of St. Paul et al., 276 
N.W.2. 
'' * * * This and other courts have frequently 
commented upon the high degree of vigilance 
necessary to constitute ordinary care where chil-
dren may reasonably be expected to be present. 
In the case at bar the defendants were engaged in 
resurfacing one of the defendant city's streets 
and were using heavy blade and disk machines 
for that purpose. * * * It was as he started back-
ing that the machine ran into and injured young 
McCarthy, who was then apparently looking back 
toward the foreman's car. * * * The backing pro-
cess was not naturally to be expected, and we 
think that the jury might well have considered 
that Byron was guilty of negligence in not better 
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looking out for or warning the boys, who, as he 
knew, were aceustomed to play around the 
machine. * * *'' 
Whenever a person is acting under sueh circum-
stances as to be required to exercise a s~pecial degree of 
care, if he fails to do so he is negligent. At (T. 162-11) 
of the record it is established that the defendant was 
on the wrong side of the street for the direction of his 
vehicle. This court has already dealt with the matter 
of driving on the wrong side of the street. 
Station et al. vs. West Macaroni Mfg. Co., 
174 P. 817, 52 Utah 426. 
'' * * * More especially, we think, the strong-
est kind of a presumption of negligence should 
be held to prevail against a party, where, as here, 
the defendant is found encroaching on that portion 
of the much-used street of a city assigned by 
the statute to another. * * *" 
Weenig Bros. vs. Manning, 262 P. 2d 491, 
1 u. 2d 101. 
"* * * It is to be conceded that being on the 
wrong side of the highway is usually a strong 
indication of negligence. * * * '' 
In this particular instance driving on the wrong 
side of the street was particularly negligent. The de-
fendant had placed himself in a position requiring the 
highest degree of care. 
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. et al. vs. Court-
ney, 79 P. 2d 235; 
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Butts vs. Anthis, 73 P. 2d 843. 
''A person guilty of negligence involving a 
breach of his duty should be held responsible for 
all the consequences which a prudent and experi-
enced man, fully acquainted with all the facts and 
circumstances which in fact exist, whether they 
could have been ascertained by reasonable dili-
gence or not, would have thought of at the time of 
the negligent act as reasonably possible to follow, 
if they had been suggested to his mind." 
Under the high degree of care imposed upon defend-
ant he should have forseen the fact that when sleds come 
around a sharp corner traveling on ice and snow, they 
do not hug the inside of the curve, but rather slide or 
skid towards the outside of the curve due to the effect 
of inertia or centrifugal force upon a body in motion. 
The defendant by backing his automobile up the coasting 
lane on the wrong side of the street had actually followed 
the outer edge of the curve, the probable side of the road 
which would be used by children. 
Courts have held that there is a duty under similar 
circumstances for a defendant to give warning of his 
approach. It is to be noted that the defendant herein 
GAVE NO W ARNlNG. The following cases illustrate 
the necessity of warning and make it a duty: 
Cleveland et al. vs. Grays Harbor Dairy Pro-
ducts, Inc., et al, 74 P. 2d 909. 
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''Where the driver is backing in a narrow 
street where other automobiles are parked and 
children a,re playing, it is his duty to sownd his 
horn .repeatedly when backing. 
"The law does not forbid the backing of an 
automobile upon the streets or highways, and to 
do so does not constitute negligence, but the 
driver of an automobile must exercise ordinary 
care in backing his machine, so as not to injure 
others by the operation, and this duty requires 
that he adopt sufficient means to ascertain 
whether others are in- the vicinity who may be 
injured. It is his positive duty to look backwards 
for approaching vehicles and to give them timely 
warning of his intention to back,- when a reason-
able necessity for it exists; and he must not only 
look backward when he commences his operation, 
but he must continue to look backward in order 
that he may notcollide with or injure those law-
fully using such street or highway. Berry on 
Automobiles, 7th Ed., § 2.236. 
''To the same effect is Taulborg vs. Ander-
son, 119 Neb. 273, 228 N.W. 528, 67 A.L.R. 642. 
With notes thereto beginning on page '647. J. Cr. 
Sheldon vs. James, 175 Cal. 474, 166 P. 8, 2 A.L.R. 
1493. 
"It may be positively said that the above 
texts and cases state the general rule and there 
are, apparently, none to the contrary.'' 
SLEIGHRIDING 
Kovacs et al. vs. Ajhar et al., 196 A. 876. 
This case is almost directly in point. One difference 
IS that the plaintiff, in the case at bar was using a 
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designated coasting lane, which in the case cited plain-
tiff was not. The following are statements which appear 
in the case: 
''It is well settled that in determining 
whether judgment n.o.v. should be entered for 
defendants the testimony should not only be read 
in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, all con-
flicts therein being revolved in their favor, but 
they must be given the benefit of every fact and 
inference of fact pertaining to the issues involved 
which may reasonably be deduced from the evi-
dence. 
''Where, under the undisputed facts, coasting 
upon a street is clearly and manifestly dangerous, 
it may be the duty of the court to so declare as a 
matter of law, but where the evidence is conflict-
ing, and the inferences to be drawn are not clear, 
the question whether plaintiff has exercised care 
and diligence to avoid danger while coasting, such 
as to be expected of a reasonably carefully and 
prudent man under like circumstances, is for the 
jury. 
"On the other hand, where a drive,r can see 
children at least 50 feet away from a crossing or 
knows they are riding on a hill, he is reqwired to 
give warning of his approach and take other 
reasonable means to guard against accident con-
sistent with the circumstances. Yeager vs. Gately 
& Fitzgerald, Inc., 262 Pa. 466, 106 A. 76; Idell vs. 
Day, supra; Rossheim vs. Bornot, 310 Pa. 154, 165 
A. 27; Fisher vs. Duquesne Brewing Co., supra; 
Morris vs. Kauffman, supra. Also Meyers vs. 
Central R. Co. of New Jersey, supra. The courts 
attention is invited to the fact that defendant 
gave absolutely no warning in the case at bar.'' 
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Smith et al. vs. Pachter, 19 A. 2d 85. 
"In determining whether the court was justi-
fied in giving binding instructons for the defend-
ant, not only should the testimony be read in a 
light most favorable to plaintiffs, all conflicts 
therein being resolved in their favor, but plain-
tiffs must be given the benefit of every fact and 
inference of fact pertaining to the issues involved 
which may reasonably be deduced from the evi-
dence. 
''On the other hand, where a drive,r can see 
children on a cross street or knows or ought to 
know that children are riding on a hill, he is 
required to give warning of his approach and 
take other reasonable mearns to guard against 
accident consistent with the circumstances. 
Everybody knows that a sled has no brakes. Once 
In motion it continues until the force of gravity fails 
to act upon it, and the force of inertia is overcome by 
friction. It has been pointed out that the defendant was 
under a Juty to exercise the highest degree of care, 
that he failed to do so. Now may it further be pointed 
out that defendant was so careless in keeping a lookout 
for young sleighriders that he failed to notice the plain-
tiff until he was only 10 feet from the defendant's car 
(T. 163-8) at which time the defendant stopped his car 
directly in the path of the plaintiff to his serious injury. 
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In the interest of justice this court should not only 
order a new trial but should also direct a verdict for 
plaintiff and require only proof of damage on the said 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. L. SCHOENHALS 
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